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During this past winter, Northwestern University was privileged to host Doug
Walton as a Fulbright visiting scholar. The visit gave me the opportunity to talk
with Doug about almost all topics of interest to argumentation scholars,
including the one that often seems the most difficult and vexing--how to find a
good, inexpensive hotel room in Amsterdam. Doug and his wife Karen
believed that Ralph Johnson had actually solved this problem, but they could
not recall the name of the hotel. So, Doug asked Ralph to help me out, and
Ralph kindly sent me an e-mail message with all the relevant particulars.
The note came while I was anxiously involved in preparing this presentation,
and I had decided, quite contrary to my original intentions, that much of it
should center on the concept of "dialectic" implicit in Johnson's formulation of
the dialectical tier (Johnson 1996a, 1996b, 1998a, 1998b). Consequently,
when I sent a thank-you note back to Ralph, I also told him something about
what I was doing--partially out of politeness, but more urgently in the hope of
getting confirmation from the man himself about a critical point. I wrote to him
that other informal logicians, such as Doug Walton, seemed to deal with
dialectic primarily in terms of a dialogic model, but that he (Johnson)
conceived dialectic primarily in terms of oppositions between alternative
positions and that this difference was important in thinking about the
relationship between rhetoric and dialectic. In response to this note, Ralph
replied: "Actually I don't think in terms of dialectic but rather of what is logically
required. I don't know what to make of 'dialectic' anymore; both Rhetoric and
Logic remain freestanding disciplines, but not, it seems, Dialectic."
This was deflating news. I was embarked on a project designed to explicate,
critique, and enlarge Johnson's concept of dialectic from a rhetorical
perspective, and now I learned that Johnson was disclaiming dialectic. What
was I to do? Well, of course, I could always resort to rhetoric, and Ralph
himself, in his paper at the last OSSA conference, had indicated how a
rhetorician could dodge just this kind of problem. Logic, he had maintained,
has the telos of rational persuasion, and thus it requires that the arguer
respond to all relevant objections to her position. On the other hand, rhetoric
has effective persuasion as its telos, and so it does not entail any such
obligation. "Suppose," Johnson continues, "that there is an objection, let us call
it O*, which the arguer knows about and which the arguer has very good
reason to believe his audience does not know about. We may suppose for
example that the arguer is editor of a journal that has just received a paper
publication in which this objection is raised; and we suppose that the arguer
knows that the author of the paper is not in the audience. From the point view
of rhetoric, there is no obligation for the arguer to deal with O*--his argument
can be perfectly effective without it" (1998a).
The rub is that I cannot count on Ralph's absence; and so even if I accepted his
view of rhetorical obligations, which I do not, the situation would still force me to
recognize the problem. Consequently, unaccustomed as I am to logically
candid persuasion, I am going to have to acknowledge Ralph's hesitation
about the "D" word and advance the thesis that Ralph Johnson, along with all
the other rhetoricians and logicians here assembled, should leave open an
important space for dialectic in their theories of argumentation.
To support this thesis, I will begin on an historical note. I will present some
characteristic differences between rhetoric and dialectic that appear in the pre-
modern tradition and that offer a basis for understanding more recent
developments. Then, in light of this historical analysis, I want to characterize
some current approaches to dialectic, with special attention to Johnson's
dialectic tier. Finally, I will suggest that the addition of a rhetorical component
into that tier might help to resolve the problems of infinite regress and
discrimination that Govier (1998a, 1998b) has located as the most significant
weaknesses in Johnson's position. More generally, against Johnson's doubts
about the status of dialectic as "free-standing" discipline, I want to maintain
that a hybrid conception of dialectic has the virtue of negotiating between logic
and rhetoric, or more properly, between strictly propositional views of
rationality and strictly instrumental views of persuasion.
1. Rhetoric and Dialectic: Some Traditional Distinctions
I need to begin this section with an important caveat. In what follows, I am going
to distinguish between rhetoric and dialectic in terms of some general
characteristics. This procedure necessarily oversimplifies a very complex
historical development and might encourage the attitude that rhetoric and
dialectic are stable disciplines possessing clear, distinct, and neatly opposed
features. In fact, no such stability exists.1 The historical record is one of almost
constant change as the identity, function, structure, and mutual relationship of
these arts become issues of argumentative contestation. The two are not fixed
entities but evolving disciplines defined and redefined by generations of
squabbling teachers, and it would be a mistake to think that the differences I
note are absolute or essential. What I attempt to do, instead, is to locate some
tendencies that mark family resemblances and differences.
In his De topicis differentiis, Boethius succinctly articulates one of the most
persistent distinctions made in separating dialectic from rhetoric: "The
dialectical discipline examines the thesis only; a thesis is a question not
involved in circumstances. The rhetorical [discipline], on the other hand,
discusses the hypothesis, that is, questions hedged in by a multitude of
circumstances. Circumstances are who, what, where, when, why, how, by what
means" (1205C). The dialectical thesis--e.g. should a man marry?--is
unencumbered by particulars, and thus dialectical arguments focus upon
principles of inference per se. On the other hand, the rhetorical hypothesis--e.g.
should Cato marry?--must deal with the specific persons and actions that enter
into consideration of a social or political situation, and so rhetorical argument
must apply principles to actual cases.2 This distinction in the issues proper to
the arts leads to two characteristic differences between them. First, dialectic
deals more directly with argumentative procedures than does rhetoric, since
rhetoric must consider how such procedures embody themselves in material
cases rather than with procedures abstractly considered. Secondly, because
the dialectical thesis engages the genus of argument, dialecticians normally
treat argumentation in its entirety. Rhetoricians are far more likely to divide
argument into different fields or genres and to consider how subject-matter,
institutions, and traditions condition the conduct of argument. Or, as my
colleague Jean Goodwin (1999) has said: "Where dialectic tries to model
argument universally, rhetoric aims only at local usefulness."
So, in the first place, rhetoric and dialectic contrast because the one deals with
concrete issues, while the other deals with abstract issues. The second
difference I want to note is more complex and has to do with the way that the
propositions of the two arts are situated. This distinction can be illustrated by
comparing Aristotle's Topica with his Rhetoric: The Topica develops
argumentative principles based on how terms connect within and across
propositions. Thus, the topics are divided into the categories of definition,
genus, property, and accident, and participation in the dialectical game
requires considerable technical knowledge about the lore of predicables. The
Rhetoric does not require such knowledge, since propositions are not broken
down into terms, and the proposition itself serves as the atomic unit of
argument. Rhetorical argumentation also involves something more than
propositional relationships, because, as Richard McKeon has noted, rhetorical
arguments must develop not just in terms of their plausibility "relative to their
alternatives, but in their plausibility relative to the audience addressed"
(1952:222).
Once again dialectic emerges as more closely connected with "reason" than
does rhetoric. Dialectic need consider only the logos of argument and can
bracket matters of character (ethos) or emotion (pathos)3. Moreover, dialectic
seems to be rationally autonomous because it proceeds according to its own
procedural norms, while rhetoric must answer to the extrinsic demands of the
audience. It is tempting to move from these observations to the conclusion that
rhetoric has no intrinsic normative standards. A number of informal logicians,
for example, offer a sharp contrast between the normative rationality of logic or
dialectic and the rhetorical standard of effectiveness.4 The reasoning here is
that since the end of rhetoric is persuasion, and since persuasion ultimately is
a matter of pragmatic effect, rhetoric can have only an extrinsic telos--effective
persuasion as measured by audience response. But this conclusion
misrepresents the position of Aristotle and most other classical rhetoricians,
and I would like to pause for a moment and consider whether and to what
extent rhetorical art can sustain intrinsic norms.
Aristotle does stipulate that the audience determines the genres of rhetoric
and the end and object of a speech. Yet, he clearly is not thinking about
particular and actual audiences; he is working within a typology of audience
functions. Thus, in the case of deliberative rhetoric, the audience must make a
judgment directed toward future time about the expediency or inexpediency of
a proposed action; in forensic oratory, the audience judges past fact in order to
decide about the justice or injustice of some action; and in ceremonial oratory,
the audience acts not as judge but as spectator (Rhetoric: 1358a-b). This
classification is not simply empirical; it establishes logically proper functions
for audiences in different contexts and implies normative standards of
obligation connected with the activity of rhetoric itself.
More generally, Aristotle does not define rhetoric in terms of persuasive effect.
Instead, he says that rhetoric is the faculty for observing in any given case the
available means of persuasion. This position implies a difference between
using the art properly and achieving a specific outcome, and Eugene Garver
aptly calls this a distinction between what can be done with words and what
can be done by words (1994: 22-41). Rhetorical argument, no matter how well
constructed, cannot always succeed in achieving its end. Too many chance
factors enter into the persuasive situation for the art to control success in any
particular case, and so rhetoric cannot always succeed by words. Yet, the art
can establish standards for excellence in performance, for what can be done
with words, and that standard is connected with values intrinsic to rhetoric. In
that sense, for example, political rhetoric can exhibit excellence as a practice
that is independent of immediate persuasive effect.
Rhetoricians in the Latin tradition make much the same point when they
differentiate the end and the duty of the orator. The end is to persuade through
speech; the duty is to speak in a manner suited for persuasion.5 Judged
according to these terms, the orator can fulfill his duty by speaking in
accordance with the art without actually achieving an extrinsic end. There is, of
course, considerable ambiguity about what it might mean to speak well
artistically, and a number of possibilities have been articulated. For Quntilian,
the standard for speaking well is ethical; for renaissance humanists, often it is
to achieve eloquence in expression; for speech act theorists (see Kauffeld,
1999), it might be to fulfill the obligations imposed by a certain kind of
discursive situation; and for other contemporary rhetoricians (see Wenzel,
1998), it might be to demonstrate an enlarged and embodied sense of
rationality. Whatever the differences among these conceptions in other
respects, all of them posit normative standards for rhetoric.
The issue, then, is not a contrast between a normative art of dialectic and a
merely empirical art of rhetoric. Rather, it is a matter of the characteristic
differences between the norms associated with both arts. From that
perspective, the most obvious conclusion is that dialectical norms are less
ambiguous, better focused, and more specific. Rhetorical standards are so
much less settled that it is difficult to locate a dominant position. But, at least in
the pre-modern tradition, I think that there is a discernable general tendency,
and that is a tendency toward a norm of appropriateness. To speak well
rhetorically as a matter of art is to demonstrate a capacity to adapt to changing
local circumstances. In other words, the circumstantial and situated character
of rhetoric encourages a norm of accommodation and flexibility--a norm
connected with phronesis or prudentia. The more stable context of dialectical
argument encourages a norm that more closely approximates abstract
rationality.
I have now considered two traditional points of comparison between rhetoric
and dialectic, the one having to do the with the issues they engage, the other
with the norms that they invoke. A third distinction arises from the discursive
practices connected with the two arts. Dialectic proceeds through questions
and answers between two interlocutors, and the goal of each interlocutor is
persuade the other. Rhetoric proceeds through uninterrupted discourse, one
speaker addressing many, and the goal is not to persuade opposing speakers
but to persuade an audience that does not participate directly in the exchange
(see, Boethius: 1205C-1206C).
This is a simple and an apparently superficial difference, but it has a number of
important consequences. When associated with a specific academic exercise,
as it is for most of its pre-modern history, dialectic is essentially and
unavoidably dialogic. A competent rhetorician must invoke premises that the
audience will accept and must anticipate objections, but the encounter with the
other is not direct. In dialectic, the turn-taking process forces an unmediated
interaction. Secondly, since the interlocutors in dialectic engage one another,
the process has a private character, whereas rhetoric is necessarily public.
Jacques Braunschwig finds this contrast crucial to Aristotle's conception of
how the two arts relate to one another: "Dialectic and rhetoric are antistrophic
in the precise sense that what dialectic is to the private and conversational use
of language (between two people alternatively speaking and hearing, asking
questions and answering them), rhetoric is to the public use of language
(political in a broad sense) addressed by a single speaker to a collective
audience" (1996:36). It is possible to conceive dialectic in a way that is less
directly connected with its origin as a private, conversational exercise, but that
origin leaves a strong impression on almost all future developments.
In fact, the private or academic character of dialectical practice fits well with
other features of dialectic that distinguish it from rhetoric--most notably the
dialectician's tendency to treat argumentation as a more formal and more
abstract activity than does the rhetorician. Braunchswig concludes that, at least
for Aristotle, the configuration of the two arts follows from their proximity to or
distance from the public world: "Dialectic basically is a greenhouse flower that
grows and flourishes in the protected atmosphere of the school. The
philosopher is able to keep it under intellectual control.... But rhetoric is a plant
growing in the open air of the city and public places. This is why it smashes
abstract schemas into fragments; it offhandedly makes fun of the most
respectable theoretical distinctions" (1996: 51).
This metaphorical and, I suppose, rather rhetorical contrast between the two
disciplines leads to the last in my list of characteristic differences--the modes
of expression proper to each of them. Rhetorical language is open, expansive,
adaptive, and ornamented. Dialectical language is closed, precise, technical,
and plain. This is a very common distinction, and it is often treated as though
rhetoric simply has something that it can add to dialectic. Dialectic expresses
arguments in the blue-collar language of logical functionality; rhetoric does a
make-over by ornamenting the verbal exterior.
This view presupposes a dichotomy between language and argument that is
alien to the mainstream rhetorical tradition. In the tradition that stretches from
Isocrates to Cicero and from there to the Renaissance humanists, content and
style, words and thoughts, the aesthetic and the rational are regarded as
interconnected parts of eloquence. Rhetorical argument is not simply
decoration added to logic. It is a fully embodied expression of reason that is at
once accommodated to and also capable of intervening in public situations.
Rhetoric, then, imbricates style and argument to achieve evocative and
emotional force, and while rhetorical argumentation often uses dialectical
principles, it does not add a linguistic veneer to them so much as it transforms
them into instruments for public action. The language of rhetoric, therefore,
effects a substantive difference between rhetorical argument and its dialectical
counterpart.
All told, I have sketched four points of contrast between dialectic and rhetoric:
(1) Dialectic deals with general, abstract issues, rhetoric with specific,
circumstantial issues; (2) dialectic considers the relationship of propositions to
one another and follows norms of logical rationality, while rhetorical
argumentation considers the relationship between propositions and situations
and follows norms that refer to appropriate social relationships; (3) dialectic
proceeds through question and answer, and the interlocutors seek to persuade
one another; rhetoric proceeds through uninterrupted discourse, and speakers
seek to persuade the audience; and (4) dialectic employs unadorned,
technical language, whereas rhetoric accommodates and embellishes
language for persuasive purposes.
Set out in these synoptic terms, the contrasts may appear orderly and decisive.
But, as I noted earlier, the tradition is not so simple, and the record shows
notable instances where scholars have mixed elements I have placed in
opposition here, often with interesting and useful results.6 My schematic is
designed only to establish characteristic differences of tendency between the
two arts and to function as a rough historical ground for sorting out
contemporary issues. The most general of these tendencies, and the main
point of this exercise, bears on the relationship of argumentation to social
context. Dialectic tends to generate procedures that work autonomously within
the practice of the art; rhetoric tends to adjust argumentation to public
situations.
Even on this point, I need to issue a caution. This isolated antithesis between
rhetoric and dialectic may exaggerate the differences between them and make
them appear as categorical opposites. As a corrective, we need to remember
that, although dialectic has some affinity with the ambitions of formal logic, it
always remains a more interactive and flexible medium of reasoning. Dialectic,
after all, deals with argumentation, not disembodied thought, and if it tends to
restrict the argumentative encounter according to rational procedures, it also
acknowledges the interplay of opposing positions and the presence of
speakers who seek to persuade one another. It employs modes of inference
that are more responsive to the matter of argument than the apodeictic logic of
the Scholastics, and it can never yield to the silent rigor of modern deductive
logic. It also derives its premises from items of social belief (endoxa) rather
than the axioms of a science or facts established through rigorous empirical
inquiry (Walton, 1999: 136-143). Consequently, dialectic emerges as more
formal than rhetoric but as more socially responsive than formal logic. It is,
perhaps, difficult to conceive as a self-standing enterprise precisely because it
is neither entirely one thing or the other. Nevertheless, however impure its
status, dialectic has a crucial role to play within the language arts, since it
offers space for mediation between the isolated thinker and the socially
engaged speaker.
 
2. The New Dialectic and Rhetoric
After several centuries of virtual exile from the academy, dialectic is once
again emerging as an important concept. This recovery follows from the rise of
informal logic during the last few decades and the effort to replace the once
dominant formal deductive model with a more flexible and practical approach
to argumentation. The historical connection between dialectic and informal
reasoning naturally brought the old term back to contemporary attention, and
though, as my opening remarks indicate, dialectic is still viewed with some
suspicion, it is making a strong bid to become the term of art for scholarship in
informal logic.
This current revival has developed along two rather different lines. One of these
options is primarily associated with the Dutch school of pragma-dialectics, and
it places emphasis on the dialogic aspects of argumentation. The normative
orientation of this approach follows from its conception of argumentation as a
cooperative effort to resolve differences of belief, and this conception, in turn,
depends upon Gricean notions of implicature and cooperation in private
conversation. The older conception of the art sustained a disputational and
agonistic view of the dialectical encounter, and in this respect, the irenic model
of van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and their colleagues contrasts with the
tradition. Nevertheless, the commitment to the relatively controlled sphere of
interpersonal dialogue marks an interesting line of continuity.
While the pragma-dialectic theory originally did not specify any relation to
rhetoric, van Eemeren and Houtlosser now have raised this issue directly and
in some detail (1998a, 1998b). They regard rhetoric as "strategic
maneuvering," recognize that self-interested elements inevitably enter into the
argumentative process, and set out to fold rhetoric into their dialectical project.
Specifically, they hold that rhetorical concerns enter into three aspects of
argumentation: the selection of premises, the accommodation to audiences,
and the use of presentational devices. This effort is still in its early stages, and
it is difficult to judge how well it can contain the sprawl of rhetoric within a
cooperative model of dialectical interaction. But signs of complication already
have appeared in Walton's recently developed concept of dialectic. Walton
also bases his theory on dialogical principles, but instead of a single over-
arching goal for argumentation, he recognizes six different dialogical forms,
some of which do not adhere to the telos of cooperation (Walton, 1998, 1999).
The second option, associated most clearly with Ralph Johnson and Tony
Blair, minimizes the significance of dialogue and stresses the defeasible and
oppositional nature of argumentation. For Johnson, the end of argumentation is
rational persuasion and not cooperative resolution of difference, and Blair
(1998) has argued that the dialogic model cannot encompass the field of
dialectic. Dialogue, he maintains, properly applies to "turn-taking verbal
exchanges between pairs of interlocutors," and while one can conceive of
other argumentative contexts by analogy to dialogue, this model tends to
misrepresent what happens in these contexts. For example, Blair notes that
much argumentation occurs in solo performances (e.g. speeches, articles,
books) where advocates of opposing positions are not actually present, and in
these cases the regulative principles of conversation hardly seem appropriate.
Thus, he concludes that all argumentation should be considered dialectical, in
the sense that it involves "doubts or disagreements with at least two sides," but
that "norms derived from dialogues" do not apply to all types of argumentation.
Johnson has extended and refined this sense of argumentation into a concept
he calls the "dialectical tier." The concept is elegant and has attracted much
attention. But there are also problems connected with it, and I suppose that
these problems are the cause of Johnson's current doubts about the status of
dialectic. In the remainder of this paper, I want to examine the dialectic tier in
order to understand how rhetoric might enter into it and why some concept of
dialectic seems necessary to sustain this rhetorical insight.
Johnson maintains that the first tier of argumentation--the "illative core" of the
activity--consists in the structure of premises and conclusions that logicians
typically study. But, he contends, this first tier does not include everything
necessary for rational persuasion because arguments emerge within a field of
controversy where objections and criticisms abound. Should an arguer fail to
address such "objections and criticisms then to that degree her argument is
not going to satisfy the dictates of rationality. Hence, if the Arguer really"
wishes "to persuade the Other rationally, the Arguer is obligated to take
account of these objections, these opposing points of view, these criticisms"
(1996a:354, see also Johnson, 1996b:264-65). This obligation occurs at the
second or dialectical tier of argument, and for Johnson, the argumentative task
remains incomplete unless and until this tier is engaged. Moreover, the
obligation the arguer incurs is not ethical or pragmatic, and Johnson insists, it
is decidedly not rhetorical. It is something derived from the manifest rationality
of argumentation per se, and it establishes stern requirements for dialectical
arguers. They must deal with an objection even if the audience is unaware of it
and even if it raises doubt about the rationality of their position; and indeed the
arguer must even respond "to criticisms that he believes (or knows) are
misguided" (Johnson 1998a, 1998b). The dialectical obligation, then, seems
dialectically structured all the way down.
In two recent papers, Trudy Govier has offered a constructive and thoughtful
critique of Johnson's view of the dialectical tier. This critique locates and
focuses upon two problems, discrimination and infinite regress. As I
understand her comments, both of these issues open ground for a less purified
and more rhetorically sensitive approach to the dialectical tier than is permitted
in Johnson's original version. The limitation of time, however, prevents me from
examining the discrimination problem, and so I must concentrate on the issue
that Govier finds the more troublesome--infinite regress.
The problem of infinite regress, Govier maintains, arises from Johnson's
requirement that every argument at the illative or core level must receive
support at the second or dialectical level. Thus, the illative argument must be
supplemented by arguments mindful of objections or alternatives to the initial
argument. But every supplementary argument is itself an argument with an
illative core and a dialectical tier, and so each supplementary argument
demands additional support from arguments that anticipate objections, and
those arguments must also have a dialectical tier, and so on through an infinite
series. This regress, Govier notes, is intolerable from either a theoretical or a
practical standpoint. And though she makes a concerted effort to find a way out
of the endless spiral, she is unable to construct either a coherent restriction on
its movement or a benign interpretation that redeems it. In the end, Govier
cannot offer an account of dialectical adequacy; that is, she cannot explain how
an argument can be adequate at the dialectical level without getting caught in a
disastrous regression (Govier, 1998b).7
Even as Govier and Johnson were engaged in this exchange at the last OSSA
conference, Nicholas Rescher presented a paper, on an apparently unrelated
theme, that sheds considerable light on the central problem in Johnson's
argument. A probative dialectic, Rescher observes, reasons from some
propositions to other propositions. This pattern of inference must proceed from
commitments already established, and in general these commitments are
obtained by other rational inferences. But, as Aristotle discovered long ago,
this process cannot continue all the way down. Somewhere there must be a
stopping point, a concession that emerges from agreements not secured
through the inferential sequence. And, says Rescher, this is precisely the point
at which rhetoric comes into play.
For Rescher, rhetoric has an evocative power; it can persuade by eliciting
agreement not through an analytic chain of discreet propositions but through
synthetic expression that captures and highlights regions of our experience
and brings them to conscious attention. Rhetorical assent, in this sense,
comes from a fittingness with some overall scheme, from the intrinsic appeal of
what is said. And this rhetorical evocation is necessary to establish the ground
for a probative dialectic: "Rational dialectic cannot dispense with rhetoric.... It
is not the presence or absence of rhetoric that is at issue: the only question--
the pivotal question, so to speak--is not whether but how much" (Rescher
1998).
Perhaps "how much rhetoric?" is not the only question. I also want to ask:
"What kind of rhetoric?." Rescher's kind is simplified and magnified; its single
function is to effect non-inferential persuasion, and it has the grand purpose of
redeeming discursive reason, of saving it from its incurable regressivity. The
kind of rhetoric I described earlier in comparison to dialectic is a more
complex and far less exalted business. It is connected with a teaching tradition
that seeks to impart skills used in practical situations, and in this tradition,
rhetoric is not opposed to argumentation, because students must learn how to
argue if they are to persuade in the places where rhetoric ordinarily occurs--in
law courts and legislative bodies, in school boards and faculty meetings. In its
every day manifestations rhetoric does small jobs using all the verbal and
cognitive tools that are available.
Nevertheless, Rescher's grand rhetoric exhibits many of the same tendencies
that characterize the more common variety. In both manifestations, rhetoric
treats language as integral, and not ancillary, to its persuasive work. In both,
rhetoric attempts to grasp a situation and to offer a fitting response to it, and in
both cases, the rhetorical faculty is better able to deal with a concrete situation
as a whole than it is to offer an epistemic or analytic account of an abstract
subject or process. Rhetoric, in big matters or small, seems able to position
arguers and arguments through an exercise of practical judgment and to offer
parameters for reason that reason alone cannot construct. It offers a ground for
argumentative relevance, since, as Raphael Demos has said: "The
enumeration of all the relevant points in favor of a theory and against its
opposite can never be completed; far more effective is to state a viewpoint in
all its completeness and in all its significant implications, and then stop: the
arguments become relevant only after this stage has been completed" (1932:
229).8
To return to the dialectical tier, I think we can now say that the problem with
Johnson's conception is that it lacks situational ballast. Johnson wants to
construct an autonomous dialectical system that can encompass all instances
of argument, and to achieve this end he must know the criteria for dialectical
adequacy in advance of any particular case of dialectical argument. But this
leaves him with an impossible task--abstract reason cannot furnish such
criteria, since it is condemned to fall into a pattern of abstract regression. The
rhetorical sensibility cuts through this cycle of frustration by offering a grounded
judgment about the case at hand and thus providing a provisional, local
closure. Such judgment is, of course, imperfect, but it is also corrigible. One
arguer's point of closure can become the ground for another's alternative
position, and the choice between the two, once they are embodied, is open to
rational argument.
This cooperative interaction between rhetoric and discursive logic, however,
cannot occur unless we have an available conception of dialectic. If logic is left
to its illative core and contemplates only isolated products of reasoned
argument, then it will stew in its own rational juices. This allows logicians the
freedom to offer intricate, technical, and precise accounts of argumentation,
but it does not help argument do work in the world. If rational argument is to
mean something in practice, it must be conceived in relationship to the
controversies and disagreements that enter into our real world experience, and
it is precisely here that argument becomes dialectical. Of course, as it touches
social reality, dialectic loses complete autonomy over its operations; it must
depend upon rhetoric to close and define the situations in which it can operate,
and so its status as a "self-standing" discipline becomes endangered. But the
loss of purity seems a small and abstract thing compared to the practical gain
that is achieved. In fact, rhetoric hazards its own definitional autonomy in this
process, since once it sets the wheels of reason into motion, its effort to
achieve "effective persuasion" must be disciplined by dialectical rationality..
In sum, neither the rhetoric of effective persuasion nor the logic of rational
persuasion should adopt theoretically purified goals. If effective persuasion
means something more than pandering to an audience, then rhetoric must find
ways to open situations to reasoned argument and to pursue reason within
these situations. And if logic means something more than an academic
exercise, it must find ways to enter the world of controversy and respond to the
rhetorically situated needs of public business. This is not deny the important
and irreducible differences between the rhetoric and logic. The two cannot be
collapsed into one another, and if they both occupy the space of
argumentation, they are most comfortably positioned at opposite ends of that
space. The boundary, however, is not impermeable, and the voice of each art
can carry over to influence the other and correct its characteristic vices, the
rhetorical evocation turning dialectic away from regressive abstraction, and the
disciplined voice of dialectic turning rhetoric away from vicious relativism. So
the two arts speak to one another in a pattern of call and response, or to use
an image from Greek theater, in balanced verses like those recited by the
chorus. And here my inquiry ends as it leads back, at the end of the millennium,
to Aristotle's insight that rhetoric is the antistrophos of dialectic.
Endnotes 
1 Mack (1993:1-14) notes some of the complications in the historical record. 
2 For a more detailed account of this distinction and its importance in
rhetorical and dialectical argumentation, see Leff (1983). 
3This point is noted by Tindale (1998) and Johnson (1998a). 
4 As, for example, Johnson (1998a). 
5 See for example, Cicero, De inventione, I 
6 For evidence of this, see, inter alia, Cogan (1984: 163-194), Mack (1993),
and Meerhoff (1988: 270-280). 
7 Govier's papers on the dialectical tier are conveniently collected in her
forthcoming book The Philosophy of Argument (1999). 
8 Demos' essay was brought to my attention by Jost and Hyde (1997: 23).
Their essay offers interesting commentary on this concept of evocation and its
relationship to rhetoric. 
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